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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--ooOoo·THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
BERnARD LAWRENCE ALEXANDER,

.
.
.
•

No. 9856

Defendant and Appellant,
--ooOoo-APPELLAiiT'S BRIEF

--ooOoo-STATEMK~T

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This case concerns (1) the validity of
an original sentence of "not less than
one year" to the Utah State Prison for the
offense of issuing a check against insufficient funds and (2) the subsequent
modifications of that sentence on motion
by the state, after it had been fully
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served, to a sentence of "not less than
five years'' to the Utah State Prison.
DISPOSITION

II~

THE LOWER COURT

After the defendant had fully served
the original sentence of not to exceed
one year in the State Prison, the lower
court, by a judge different from the one
who had imposed the original one year
sentence, resentenced the defendant,
nunc pro tunc, to a term not to exceed
five years and remanded him to the
custody of the State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks a determination
(1) that the original sentence was a
valid sentence for the maximum period of
one year, (2) that the modification of
that sentence to a sentence not to
2
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exceed five years is void, and (3) that
the defendant has fully served the lawful term imposed upon him.
STATE~~~T

(The

OF THE FACTS

defendant-app~llant

referred to as

defend&""lt~

will be
"T" refers

to the transcript of testimony.
refers to the ::-ecord

~~hich

"R''

is separate

from the transcript cf testimony &1d in
which the papers do not appear to be in
logical sequence.

The few items in a

Supplemental Record will be so designated.)
After being incarcerated in the Weber
Co~~ty

jail for three months, most of

which was spent in solitary confinement,
(T. 11) the defendant pleaded guilty
before Judge John F. Wahlquist to a
charge of issuing a check against insufficient funds. (R. 21)

Judge Wahlquist
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requested a presentence report and set a
date for sentencing. (R* 21)

On December 26, 1961, the date set for
sentencing, the district attorney recommended a period of

o~e

year but had some

reluctance with referE::·ncG to the county
jail because of the fact that the defendant had already spent three months in
solitary confinement, and because there
were unpleasantries in the jail. (T. 26)
In the discussion at this time among
Cocrt, counsel and defendant the problems incident to a one year sentence in
the county jail were discussed. (T. 2428)

There is no mention in the record

of intention or recommendation for a
longer sentence. (T. 24-28)
Shortly before passing sentence, the
Court said, "And I don't want you to be
4
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in a long time this time.

I want you

to know you are going to get a fair
chance.

At the same time I can't put

you back in the county jail.
equipped to hold you.

It isn't

You will end up

sitting in solitary the whole time.
You won't see a radio nor a movie.''
(T. 27, 28)
he

war.;~:ed

The Court then stated that

to give the defendant a sen-

tence of one year so that he could give
an accounting of himself. (T. 28)
In the course of the discussion, the
Court sentenced the defendant to one
year in the state prison (T. 28, Line
16).

As the final operative act in the

record for that day, the Court pronounced
the following sentence:

"I sentence you

to serve a term in the Utah State Prison
not to exceed one year." (T. 28, Lines 27-29)
5
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The document captioned 1tJ\ldgment, sente;:'lce and commitment" is worded somewhat
diff~rently

from the oral sentence pro-

nounced in open court in that that document carries the additional comment
(apparently inserted with a different
typewriter) ''the last four years of the
'not to exceed 5 years' contemplated by
the statute is hereby suspended as an act
of mercy because of the great injustices
that were suffered by the defend&it in
the past. ••

It carries the statement that

sentence was to begin December 26, 1961.
(R. 22)

The defendant immediately began serving
his sentence.

He did not appeal.

The

state did not appeal.
By a letter dated November 29, 1926, the
6
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defendant asked Judge Wahlquist if, in
the event the Board of Pardons ignored
the one year sentence, a Writ of Error
Coram Nobis would be the appropriate
remedy.

Although this letter of the

29th of November, is included in the
record on this appeal no minute entry
was ever made in the trial court records concerning it, nor does it bear
any identifying filing stamp.
By motion filed in the afternoon of
December 19, 1963, the attorney general
moved to modify the sentence. (R. 26)
The record does not show service of this
motion on the

d~~endant,

but the defendant

was brought into court on the 24th of
December, at which time Judge Wahlquist
transferred the case to Judge Norseth's
court. (R. 31)

Judge Norseth continued

7
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th~

case to the 27th of December. (R. 33)

At the hearing on the 27th of December,
1962, Judge Wahlquist, called as a witness,
explained his reasons for the one year sentence:

He said the defendant's record was

almost fantastic. (T. 11)

He had been in

jail for six months before being brought
to Utah on the present charge. (T.ll)

The

defendant had spent most of the next three
months before trial in solitary confinement; he had had difficulty with his attorney; and he was combatant by nature and
had been done injustices in the past. (T.ll)
Mr. Tite, the Probation Officer who had
prepared the presentence report, and
Mr. Newey, the District Attorney, were
satisfied that the defendant had served
tWice on convictions later set aside. (T. 13)
In fact, he had served three times for
8
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convictions which had been set aside.
(T. 13)

He took these matters into con-

sideration in sentencing defendant. (T. 13)
The probation officer believed the defendant somewhat combatant in nature and
somewhat paranoid, (T. 14) but both he
and the judge felt it would be best just
once to deal fairly with the defendant
and give him a better chance of getting
by in society when he was released.
(T. 15)

The judge talked with the pro-

bation officer for some time. (T. 15)
The probation officer felt the defendant
was a source of trouble in the county
jail, that the jailers had not been
unfair with defendant, but nonetheless
defendant had served the last three
months in solitary. (T. 15, 16)

The

probation officer was concerned about
9
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the defendant's mental health. (T. 16)
The judge testified that the district
attorney recommended one year in jail,
except for the reservation about the
unpleasantries involved. (T. 16)

The

district attorney had no objection to
the one year term. (T. 16)
The judge repeated that both he and the
probation officer felt it was one time
when obvious fair play might pay off.

(T. 17)
The judge intended the one year to be
served in the county jail, except for
the report from the probation officer
that the defendant was not getting along
in the county jail. (T. 17)
The proceedings on the 18th of December, 1962, when the plea of guilty was
10
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entered and the presentence report was
requested, and the proceedings on the
26th of December, 1962, when the original sentence was pronounced were read
by the court reporter. (T. 20-28)

The

defendant was examined and cross examined. (T. 3-9, 29-35)

The presentence

report was received in evidence (T. 13)
as was a copy of the letter from Judge
Wahlquist to the Board of Pardons.

(T. 18)
At the

te~ination

of the hearing,

Judge Norseth expressed the view that
the original sentence was illegal.

It

was his opinion that he had no recourse
but to resentence the defendant to a
term not to exceed five years in the
state prison. (T. 42, 43)

He did not

feel that he could legally sentence the
11
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defendant to a term to the county jail
nunc pro

tunc~

(T. 43)

He declined to

sentence the defendant to a sentence of
not to exceed one year in the county
jail to commence then. (To 44)

Judge

Norseth resentenced the defendant to
serve not to exceed five years in the
state penitentiary, sentence to date
from the original date of incarceration.
(T. 43)

The defendant was remanded to

the state prison. (T. 44)
On December 31, 1962, Judge Wahlquist
informed defendant, in effect, that
counsel would be appointed for him.
(R. 28)

Twice the defendant wrote Judge

Wahlquist to say that counsel had not
appeared. (R. 30, 34)

On February 20,

1963, no counsel having appeared to
assist him,

defend~~t

filed his own

notice of appeal.
12
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ARGUMENT

POINT I.

THE RESENTENCE TO A TERM OF

NOT TO EXCEED FIVE YEARS IS VOID
BECAUSE TRE ORIGINAL

SENT&~CE

OF

NOT TO EXCEED ONE YEAR IN THE STATE
PRISON WAS A VALID
TINE,

EVEJ.~

S&~TENCE

AS TO

IF INCORRECT AS TO PLACE.

After spending almost three months in
solitary confinement in the Weber County
Jail, the defendant pleaded guilty before
Judge Wahlquist to the offense of uttering a check against insufficient funds,
a violation of Utah Code Anno. 1953,
76-20-11, as amended.

This section pro-

vides that such an offense "is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail
for not more than one year, or in the
state prison for not more than five years""
13
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In addition to this choice the trial
court has wide discretion vested in him
by virtue of Utah Code

l~o.

1953, 77-

35-17, to suspend the imposition or the
execution of a sentence and place the
defendant on probation, if it appears
compatible with the public interest.
The only conditions which are expressly
statutorily stated as conditions of the
probation refer to the payment of fines,
restitution and reparation, and support
of dependents.

However, the impostion

of other conditions has been approved by
the courts

~~d

it is customary practice

to impose such conditions to the probation as to the court may deem desirable,
including the condition that the defendant spend some time in confinement.

14
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In the instant case the trial court had
available the various alternatives sanctioned expressly by the statute and by
customary usage, which included, the
one year in the county jail, the five
years in the state prison, or the suspension of the imposition or execution of the
sentence

ru1d

the placing of the defen-

dant on probation under such conditions
as the trial court may have deemed appropriate, including the condition that the
defendant spend some time in confinement
as a condition precedent to the probation.
There is vested in the Board of Pardons
the power to permit prisoners in the
county jail or state prison to go on
parole.

Utah Code

!~no.

1953, 77·62-9o

In the instant case the trial
court sought and received the counsel

15
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and assistance of the Adult Parole and
Probation Department. (R. 21)

The dis-

trict attorney was present at and participated in the proceedings to determine
the sentence.
The trial judge, upon the advice and
with the assistru1ce of the presentence
report, determined that a one year confinement would be appropriate in the
case. (R. 24-28)

This was also the dis-

trict attorney's recommendation.

~(I

26)

The record allows of no question but
that the trial court intended to impose
a one year sentence upon the recommendation of the probation officer, ru1d the
district attorney. (R. 28)

It was felt

that it would be far better that for
once in his life the defendant be
treated fairly, that he be given a

16
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chance at rehabilitation while incarcerated and &, opportunity upon release
to take his place in society. (R. 15, 17)
The Court felt a five year term,

~,der

the peculiar circumstances of the case,
would not accomplish this end.

The

probation officer felt the same way.

The

district attorney concurred. (R. 16)
However, because of the peculiar circumstances involved in this case, circumstances which have not come to our
attention in any other case which we
have read, the Court felt that it would
be better for the defendant to serve this
year in the state prison rather than in
the county jail. (R. 17)
Considering the wide discretion lodged
in the sentencing court, the discretion
to choose between alternative sentences,
17
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the power to suspend imposition of the
sentence, the power to suspend execution of the sentence, the power to
impose conditions upon his probation,
including the condition that the defendant spend time in confinement, the
sentence to a term not to exceed one
year was a valid sentence for that
period of time.

The fact that it was

imposed in the prison rather than the
county jail should not alter this conclusion.
The statute authorizing

p~~ishments

provides for two punishments, one

p~i

ishment less onerous than the other in
both time and place.

Time, of course,

is more significant in determining the
degree of burden imposed by a sentence;
place, while not to be ignored, is
18
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subordinate to time.

In the instant

case the Court had the power to sentence to the less onerous term as to
both time and place and desired to do
so.

Because of circumstance

~&ique

to this case, the Court, the probation
officer and the district attorney felt
that the place authorized for the less
onerous combination would be inappropriate.

Accordingly the sentence was

for the less onerous timeo

The sen-

tence in this case was a sentence of
not to exceed one year in the state
prison. (T. 28, lines 27-29)
The sentence is the oral pronow1cement of the pm1ishment imposed by the
judge.

State v. Dowthard, 92 Ariz.

44, 373 P.2d 357 (1962).
Anno~

Utah Code

1953, 77-35-3, provides that in
19
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the case of felony, the defendant must
be personally present, but in the case
of a misdemeanor, judgment may be pronounced in his absence.

Utah Code Anno.

1953, 77-35-11, provides that if, at the
time set for sentencing, no sufficient
cause is alleged or

showt~

as to why it

should not be pronounced, sentence must
thereupon be renderedo

It was, and it

was a sentence to "a tenn in the Utah
State Prison not to exceed one year.•i
(T. 28, lines 27-29)

Accordingly, the

comment on the order of commitment concerning the suspending of the last five
years of the sentence as an act of mercy
c&,not alter the oral sentence's validity any more than one party to a written
contract can alone alter the contract
by written comments after the contract
is entered into"
20
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In view of the wide discretion granted
the trial court by law and by customary
practice, the sentence of "11ot to exceed
one year" to the state prison is a valid
sentence.

The imposition of punishment

to a place other than that literally
authorized by the statute does not make
the sentence void, but at most merely
voidable as to the excess, particularly
where, as here, the defendant has served
the sentence without complaint or appeal.
The rule is w·\311 established that a
sentence excessive as to some part is a
valid sentence but that the excessive
part is void or voidable.
Abeyta v. People, 112 Colo. 49, 145

P.2d 884 (1944);
In re Chase, 18 Idaho 561 110 Pac.

1036 (1910).
21
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In Ex parte Tani, 29 Nev. 385, 91
Pac. 137 (1907), the defendant was
sentenced to, and incarcerated in,
the state prison when it should have
been the county jail&

On a writ of

habeas corpus he demanded release on
the ground the sentence was void.
The Court rejected this argument,
holding that the error in the place of
commitment may be rejected as surplusage and directing that the defendant be
delivered to the county jail to serve
the balance of his time.
Even more so than in

Ta~,

it would be

appropriate here to disregard as surplusage the incorrectness as to place
where the defendant has fully served a
lawfully authorized term,

even though

in a place of confinement more onerous
22
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than that literally called for by the
statute.

POINT II.

ASSUMING THE HOTION TO NODIFY

THE SENTENCE TO BE APPROPRIATE, IT

~lAS

PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE SECOND JUDGE
TO RESENTENCE THE DEFENDANT CONTRARY TO
THE INTENTION OF THE ORIG!N.t\L

JUDGE
ONE

SENTE:~CING

TI:-Ii•T THE INPRISONMENT NOT EXCEED

Y~'1.R.

The record does not explain why the
original judge did not hear the second
proceeding.

The judge who did resentence,

a year after the original sentence, did
not honor the intentions and lawfully
authorized discretion of the original
sentencing judge.

It would appear from

the record that this was done by the
23
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second trial court upon the erroneous
assumption that there was no alternative
but to so do, for it is clear, without
question, that the original sentencing
judge intended incarceration for a
period not to exceed one year.

The

second sentencing judge could have
effected this intention by a modification of the sentence to read county jail
in place of state prison, or by other
means, but he chose not to do so and
instead resentenced the defendant to a
term four hundred per cent greater than
the term he had already fully served.
This instance is similar to the situation in Saldana v. U.

s.,

365 U.S. 646

(1961) where the first judge clearly
intended to impose a 5-year sentence but
a second judge imposed a 20-year sentence.
24
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The Supreme Court said that the defendant
had, by this action, been deprived of
the fair administration of justice.
They reduced the sentence to the originally intended five year term.
We submit that the integrity of the
judicial process requires that, in those
few cases where a second judge must pass
sentence on, or resentence, a prisoner,
the second judge follow the intentions
of the first judge in all instru1ces
where it is manifiest what the first
judge's intentions were and where such
objectives can be lawfully

accomplished~

This could have been accomplished in the
instant case by any of several means,
including the modification of the sentence to have read "not to exceed one
year in the county jail" nunc pro tunc,
thus having fully and completely met the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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express intention of the first judge as
to the lawfully authorized sentence he
desired that the defend&it serve.

POINT III.

THE FOUR HUNDRED PERCENT

INCREASE OF

DEFENDlu~T 0 S SEl~TE~:lCE

· AFTER THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE HAD BEEN
FULLY SERVED VIOw\TES THE FORMER
JEOPARDY Ai'lD THE DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS OF THE STATE Ai'ID FEDERAL
COHSTITUTIONS.

The second judge was obligated to
treat the sentence of the defendant as
fully served not only because of the
express intent of the first judge that
the defendant serve not more than one
year, but also because the Utah and the
federal constitutions prohibit the

26
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enlargement of a sentence in this
~rticle

1, Section 12 of the Utah Con-

stitution provides that no person
e

•

•

manner~

13

shall

be twice put in jeopardy for the

same offense.n

The Fifth Amendment to

the United States Constitution, which
applies to state action through the
Fourteenth Amendment, similarly provides
"nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb."

Article 1, Section 7

of the Utah Constitution contains a
similar due process provision to that of
the Fourteenth

/~endment

to the United

States Constitution.
One of the rights of individuals protected by both the double jeopardy provisions and the due process provisions
of the state and federal constitutions
27
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is that once a person has begun serving
a valid sentence, that sentence shall not
be augmented or increased.

If this rule

applies to an accused upon beginning the
execution of his sentence, it must also
apply to the accused who has fully served
his sentence.
While it may be that immediate rectification of an error in the sentence may
be valid as against constitutional attack,
Bozza v.

u.s.,

330

u.s.

160 (1947), it is

equally clear that to alter a sentence by
increasing its severity after the defendant has commenced serving it is proscribed by the constitutional prohibitions
against double jeopardy for these prohibitions apply to double punishment as well
as to a second trial.

u.s.

Ex parte

Lru1g~,

85

(18 Wall.) 163 (1374).
28
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We are not unmindful of the decisions
from a few state courts and the early
decision from this court in Nutart v.
Pra~~'

51 Utah 246, 170 Pac. 67 (1917),

which until carefully analyzed and com . .
pared with the facts of the instant case,
the statutes involved in the instant
case, and the constitutional protections
afforded by the state and the federal
constitutions might superficially
appear to justify the action of the
resentencing judge.

However, they do

not hold up under examinationQ
For example, Mutart v. Pratt involved
an entirely different factual and legal
situation.

The statute there involved

did not require the sentencing judge
to pronounce a sentence as to time in
any manner whatsoever, but in fact

29
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prohibited his so doing.

In addition,

in thnt cnse there wns absolutely
no discretion in the sentencing judge
to choose between different degrees of
punishment.

While it may be that the

decision in that case could have been
justified on grounds not stated in the
opinion, it is clear that the extension
of the unnecessary, implied dicta in
that case concerning the non-necessity
of the state to comply with even minimum standards of procedural due process
in the matter of sentences would be
violative of both the double jeopardy
and the due process clauses of the state
and the federal constitutions if applied

here~

Two recent cases do suggest some
guidelines in this area.
~lements,

In Tahash v.

234 Ind. 197, 125

l~.E.2d

439

(1955), the defendant was sentenced to
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a 2-year sentence although the statute
required an indeterminate sentence of
from 2 to 5 years.

The Court cites

§ 9-1827, Burns' 1942 Replacement (now

§

9-1827~

Burns' 1956 Replacement)

which provides (similar in effect to
our Utah Code .:umo. 1953, 77-35-20)
that an erroneous determinate sentence
which should have been indeterminate
shall be deemed to be the correct indeterminate sentenceo

The Supreme Court

of Indiana said, at page 440:
The only constitutional interpretation
of this statute would be that
it authorizes the correction of
an erroneous sentence, but the
proper procedure must include
notice to the prisoner and his
presence in court when the change
of sentence is ordered. His day
in court includes this appearancea
The statute, taken alone, cannot
change a sentence by the court.
The handing down of a sentence is
not a ministerial act, but is a
judicial act.
31
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The Court did not spell out what
proper notice was but from the tenor
of the case it is quite unlikely that
notice given only a week prior to the
expiration of the full sentence would
meet the applicable constitutional
test, particularly where the matter
was not heard until after the actual
end of the full sentencea
In §Ranton v. Clapp, 78 Idahv 234,
299 P.2d 1103 (1956) the Idaho Court,
despite extremely harsh earlier cases,
held that to apply the Idaho indeterminate sentence law literally would
deprive the defendant of his valuable
right to appeal, and that although an
erroneou~

sentence could be corrected

by a timely motion by the state or an

appeal from an adverse ruling, where
32
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the prisoner had served his sentence
without either the timely motion or
the appeal from a denial of such motion,
the prisoner would be discharged although
the statute called for a much longer sentence.
We respectfully submit that the state
and federal double jeopardy and due
process provisions limit the power of
the legislature and prevent its calling
black white and white black without
regard to the concepts of procedural
due process as suggested in

~hash

and

Spanton.

POIHT IVe

'ffiE

i~PEAL

WAS TIHELY BECAUSE

THE RESEHTENCE AFTER THE
OF THE

ORIGIN~·~L

EXPI~\TION

SENTENCE IS EITHER A

"FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION" OR ".l\N'

33
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ORDER HADE, AFTER JUDGMENT, AFFECT_
ING THE SUBST!aNTI.AL RIGHTS OF" TiiE
DEFENDA.L~T.

Upon request of the Court we are
briefing the question of the timeliness of the appeal.
On the 27th of December, 1962, the

defendant, after having fully served
his original one-year term, was sentenced to a term not to exceed five
years.

Despite requests for aid and

fu, assurance of appointment of counsel,
none appeared. (R. between 27 and 28,
28, 30, 34)

Within the two months pro-

vided for filing notices of appeal in
criminal cases the defendant filed his
notice himself.

(Supplemental Record)

Judge Wahlquist called the case a
34
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matter of motion to modify sentence.
(R. 31)

Judge Norseth called it a

hearing on a writ of habeas
(R. 32)

corpus~

Defendant called it a writ

of habeas corpus or a coram nobis proceeding~

(Supplemental

Re~ord)

We long ago dispensed with the notion
that mislabeling a pleading or other
paper was fatal and have adopted tr.e
view that it is the substance of a
matter that counts; not the name it may
erroneously be given by counsel• or by
the Court, let alone by a layman.
The question is not whether this was
in whole or in part a habeas corpus or
coram nobis proceeding, but whether it
comes within the scope of the statute
authorizing appeals in criminal matterso
Utah Code

Aru~o.

1953, 77-39-3, provides
35
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''i~

appeal may be taken by the defendant;

(1) From a final judgment of conviction.
(2) From an order made, after judgment,
affecting the substantial rights of the
party. •:

We submit that the resentence

comes within both of these provisions.
It is clear from the record that the
resentencing proced,..lre C.)ald only :tave
bee:1 prompted by the Statei s m=>tiol"l to

modify.

It cannot be denied that the

defendan~

was at this time given an

opportun··Lcy to present his side of the
matter,

~hich

equally

i~

he did, but this

wa~

opposition to the State's

motion as well as, if at all, a procedure in the nature of a writ of habeas
corpus or coram nobis.
The term judgment of conviction refers
to the sentence. State v. Fedder, 1 Utah
2d 117~ 262 P.2d 753 (1953).
36
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In State v. Sawyer, 54 Utah 275,

182 Pac. 206 (1919) the verdict was
rendered on May 17, 1918, but sentence
was not pronounced

Sept. 21.

~~til

Notice of appeal was filed the same day
and was held timely.

Had the time run

from the rendering of th3 verdict, it
would have been too late..
sai:.1;

The Coul:'t

t'[T]he judgment Up:>n th'3 verdict

was not rendered and entered until
Septembe~

this

21, 1918,

app2.~1

o

o

was taken in

•

Therefore
time~"

In any Gvent, the resentencing to a
term four hundred p,3:rcent greater than
the original sentence, after it had
been fully served, must come within
the scope of an order made after judgment (if it not be deemed a judgment)
affecting the substantial rights of the
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party.

See Adamson v. Brockba.Ylk, 112 Utah

52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947)•
Even if the Court should find that
this case is a eivi1 and not a criminal
matter, serious constitutional problems
under both the state and the federal
constitutions may exist because of the
failure to provide the defendant with
counsel

~.n

time to perfect his appeal.

Section 12 of Article 1 of the Utah Constitution protects the right of convicted persons to an appeal.

Such a right

would also come under the due process
clause of Section 7 of Article 1 of the
Utah Constitution.

That such a right to

counsel on appeal in state cases is also
protected by the United States Constitution has recently been affirmed in the
rlcl

case of Douglas v. California, 9 L.Ed.A8ll
(1963).

38
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We suboit that failure to provide
co~1sel

in time to perfect an appeal

from the resentence comes within the
ambit of the Utah and the federal
constitutions and, were it to result
in the loss to the

defenda~t

of his

one right to appeal from the resentence,
it would deprive him of a most valuable right protected by both constitutions.

CONCLUSION
The defendant respectfully submits
that the trial court erred in sentencing
him to a term not to exceed five years
in the state prison for the reason that
he had already served a valid sentence
of not to exceed one year for the same
offense.
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Defendant prays that this court
determine that the original sentence
was a valid sentCl"lce of a term
not to exceed one year, that the
rcsentencG to a term not to exceed
five years is void, and that the defendant has fully served the lawful
term imposed upon him.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBE..~T

L. SCH1'1ID and

LESTER J. l1AZOR
College of Law

University of Utah
Salt Lake City 12, Utah
Attorneys for the
Defendru1t-Appcllant
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